Iran's Nuclear
Program/Facilities
Russia
Warns U.S. Against Striking Iran
Nuclear Missile Program
 
During a press
conference by the representative office of the National Council of
Resistance of Iran held in Washington DC, in mid-August 2002, the
existence of a secret nuclear facility at Arak was revealed. Located at
the Qatran Workshop near the Qara-Chai river in the Khondaub region, in
Central Iran, 150 miles south of Tehran, construction on the heavy-water
facility was reportedly begun in 1996 by the Atomic Energy Organization of
Iran (AEOI). The location of the facility was reportedly determined by the
need for large quantities of water which can be easily supplied by the
Qara-Chai river.
As of mid-August
2002, the site was said to be 85% completed with some of the facility's
units able to carry nuclear tests in the Fall of 2002. Distinguishing
features at the site include towers that are 3 meters thick, 48 meters
high and each with 70 mesh trays.
According to the
National of Resistance of Iran, a front organization, named the Mesbah
Energy Company, has been used to prevent unwanted disclosures. The
headquarters of the Mesbah Energy Company are located in Tehran.
As a result of its
clandestine nature, the project was reportedly falling outside of the
budgetary supervisory purview of Iran's Organization for Planning and
Budget and was also not registered officially with the AEOI's Human
Resources Office. Instead, Bureaucratic operations of the project are
directly supervised by the Security and Itelligence office of the AEOI and
of the Central Office of Security. According to the NCRI, the project's
managing director was Davood Aqajani; its supervisor was Dr. Mohammad
Qannadi, Deputy for Production of Nuclear Fuel; and its operational
manager was Behman Asgarpour.
The Institute for
Science and International Security (ISIS) on 12 December 2002 released an
issue brief expressing concern that Iran is trying to develop "the
capability to make separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium, the
two main nuclear explosive materials." ISIS acquired satellite imagery of
a site near the town of Arak, where a plant is under construction that
appears to be designed to produce heavy water. Heavy water is used to
moderate the nuclear chain reaction in one type of nuclear reactor, that
could be used either for civilian power production or to produce bomb
materials. The nuclear reactor under construction at Bushehr does not use
heavy water, nor do current Iranian research reactors need it in amounts
that would justify construction of such a facility.
At a 13 December
2002 briefing, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher that there was
what Boucher termed "hard evidence," that Iran appeared to be constructing
a uranium enrichment plant at Nantaz, as well as a heavy water plant. "The
suspect uranium- enrichment plant ... could be used to produce highly-
enriched uranium for weapons. The heavy-water plant could support a
reactor for producing weapons-grade plutonium. These facilities are not
justified by the needs of Iran's civilian nuclear program," he said.
The UN's
International Atomic Energy Agency's inspectors will visit Iran on 25
February 2003 to look at nuclear facilities under construction there. "We
will be looking at facilities not even completed yet that are not formally
under safeguards," as chief IAEA spokesman Mark Gwozdecky puts it. The
visit is the first step in a process of many visits to understand the
architecture of the place and to design the most effective monitoring
regime for that facility." American officials believe new nuclear
facilities in Iran could be used to make nuclear weapons.
Iran strongly
rejected the allegations and reiterated that the two plants were intended
to generate electricity. "In the next 20 years, Iran has to produce 6,000
megawatts of electricity by nuclear plants and the launch of these two
centers are aimed at producing necessary fuel for these plants," Foreign
Minister Kamal Kharrazi said.
The Arak heavy
water plant only makes sense if it is paired with a plutonium production
reactor, which has not yet been located.
A much-anticipated
report by the International Atomic Energy Agency, distributed to
governments on 06 June 2003 in advance of a meeting of the agency's board
of governors on 16 June 2003, concluded that Iran has failed to comply
with its nuclear safeguards agreement. The IAEA report revealed Iran is
building a previously unacknowledged heavy-water research reactor at Arak.
That facility could increase Iran's technological options for the
production of nuclear weapons. A 05 May 2003 letter from Iran informed the
agency for the first time of its intention to construct a heavy water
research reactor, a type often associated with production of plutonium for
nuclear weapons programs. One report suggested the reactor would have a
powerl level of 40MW.
Aside from a small
IAEA-safeguarded "zero-power" research reactor located at the Esfahan
Nuclear Technology Center, Iran has no known heavy water reactor and no
need for an indigenous source of heavy water. Iran's only nuclear power
reactor expected to become operational within the next decade is the
light-water reactor under construction with Russian help at Bushehr. This
raised questions about Iran's intentions in constructing an
industrial-scale heavy water production plant at Arak. Heavy-water
moderated reactors are better suited for plutonium production than are
light water reactors. The US believed Iran's true intent is to develop the
capability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons, using both the
plutonium route (supported ultimately by a heavy-water research reactor)
and the highly enriched uranium route (supported by a gas centrifuge
enrichment plant).
According to
reports published in Russia, apparently based on information developed by
the Russian Federal Security Service, facilities located at Arak are
involved in R&D of unguided missiles, and modifications of the Scud-S
missile.
As of 11
April 2000, Russian 2-meter resolution KVR-1000 imagery coverage was not
available via the SPIN-2 service on
TerraServer,
nor was archived Space Imaging IKONOS 1-meter imagery of this facility
available on the
CARTERRA™ Archive.
June 16, 2003, 4:47 PM (GMT+02:00)
DEBKAfile’s
Washington sources reveal that the Americans have turned up increasing
indications that Iran is marching forward with its clandestine nuclear
programs, which are the subject of the current International Atomic Energy
Agency board meeting in Vienna on Monday and Tuesday, June 16 and 17. The
board is examining evidence that the Iranians have secretly set up a
massive uranium enrichment facility designed to house tens of thousands of
centrifuges. This facility could support the production of weapons-grade
uranium and plutonium.
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Washington will insist that the United
Nations nuclear watchdog declare Iran to be in breach of the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treat (NPT), which it has signed.
The IAEA chief Mohammed ElBaradei has
already circulated a harsh report to board members, accusing Tehran of
failing to give notice of certain nuclear material and activities.
Inspection is hampered by Iran’s refusal sign the Additional Protocol
which would grant international inspectors wider access and more
intrusive, short-notice visits to suspected atomic sites. For example,
Iran has denied ElBaradei’s request for inspection access to Kalaye
Electric Company where parts for centrifuges are built in violation of the
NPT.
Having Iran declared in serious breach
of the NPT at the IAEA board meeting in Vienna would open the way for a
United States complaint to the UN Security and the tabling of a resolution
endorsing tough action against Iran.
Tehran, for its part, is employing
dilatory tactics to block this move in order to buy extra time to complete
its nuclear weapons program unhindered. Intelligence experts estimate that
Iran will have developed a nuclear bomb and delivery-capable missiles by
the end of 2004. To fend off mounting US pressure, the spokesman of Iran’s
Atomic Energy Organization to the IAEA took an aggressive tack: First give
us access to nuclear technological data for civilian purposes and promise
that our signature on the Additional Protocol will not interfere with our
nuclear infrastructure development.
Iran’s posture against the US strikes a
sympathetic chord in the European Union - with which Tehran is negotiating
for a trade deal - raising the prospect of leaving Washington to go it
alone in seeking international support for firm global action against Iran
as happened in the case of Iraq. The ploy was borrowed from North Korea,
who in the 1990s successfully persuaded the Clinton administration to part
with the funds and technology for advanced nuclear reactors that later
served Pyongyang for developing its nuclear program and its nuclear
collaboration with Tehran.
DEBKA-Net-Weekly
was the first publication on November 15, 2002 to expose Iran’s secret
nuclear plants in Natanz and Arak. Both are supervised by the Iranian
Atomic Energy Organization, a state body controlled by the National
Security Council that defers only to Iran’s radical spiritual leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Natanz, where nuclear fuel (enriched
uranium) is produced, is located 100 miles north of Isfahan on the old
Natanz-Kashan highway. A huge facility, big enough to employed hundreds of
workers, it is buried many feet underground and set in layers of concrete.
The director of this site is an IAEO official called Dawood Agha-Jani.
The Arak facility produces heavy water
at a place called Qatran Workshop close to the Qara-Chai River, three
miles from Khondab in northern Azerbaijan. A second IAEO official,
Daryoush Sheibani, heads this project.
Unfinished structures were left at both
locations to support official claims that building is uncompleted and the
sites are not active.
Peter Brookes: Atomic
Ayatollahs
June 28, 2004
Iran ratcheted up international nuclear tensions late last week by
announcing it would resume (as soon as tomorrow) building nuclear
centrifuges - an essential element in nuclear-weapons development.
The rest of the world keeps protesting - and Tehran keeps thumbing
its nose right back.
Iran insists its "civilian" nuclear power program is for
"peaceful" purposes only. That’s laughable - but the consequences
aren’t.
If other countries don’t take decisive action soon, the world will
have the 9th nuclear weapons state - and its first nuclear-armed
state that also sponsors terrorism - faster than you can say
"atomic ayatollah."
Efforts to stop Tehran’s atomic quest have been lackluster so far.
The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) latest rebuke, for
example, didn’t even stop the mullahs from making last week’s
in-your-face announcement. The European Union’s "peace in our
time" agreement with Iran last October on nuclear transparency and
inspections has become a tragic joke.
Even Iran’s old pals, Russia and China, don’t buy Tehran’s line
anymore. Iran’s nuclear mendacity and obfuscation has become so
obvious — and embarrassing — that Beijing and Moscow deserted the
Islamic republic and supported the critical IAEA resolution.
(Although China has been accused recently of secretly aiding the
Iranian nuclear program in exchange for oil...)
The confrontation between the IAEA and Iran has dragged on for two
years now. And time is on Iran’s side: Each day, it moves one step
closer to achieving its nuclear ambition.
As the U.S. ambassador to the IAEA said, "The passage of time is
not a neutral factor in proliferation cases." Iran may become a
nuclear power in the next 18 months.
Supporting Iranian nuclear efforts are:
A heavy-water
reactor at Arak, which will produce large amounts of plutonium
suitable for use in nuclear weapons.
A nuclear-conversion facility at Isfahan to produce uranium
hexafluoride, a basic ingredient for developing nukes.
Iran insists that these facilities are for producing nuclear fuel
for its civilian energy sector, which will free oil and gas
reserves for export.
But as John Bolton, under secretary of state for arms control and
international security, testified on Capitol Hill last week, "The
costly infrastructure to perform all of these activities goes well
beyond any conceivable peaceful nuclear program."
Plus, Iran, with the world’s second-largest natural-gas reserves,
wastes enough gas each year to generate four 1,000-megawatt
nuclear reactors’ worth of electricity.
Bottom line: Iran doesn’t need nuclear power.
Will the international community abandon its so-far-impotent ways?
It’s time for the U.N. Security Council to insist on broad,
multilateral economic sanctions.
Tough sanctions
made Libya knuckle under on weapons of mass
destruction (WMD),
may have crippled Saddam Hussein’s WMD programs and, last week,
led even
North Korea
back to the nuclear negotiating table in Beijing.
But getting sanctions in place won’t be easy. Countries such as
France, Germany and Japan have invested heavily in Iran’s
centralized economy.
For instance, the French energy giant, Total Group, recently
signed a $2 billion joint venture with the state-owned National
Iranian Oil Company for natural-gas exploration. Germany’s
business presence in Iran exceeds France’s, and the European Union
is looking at a bilateral trade agreement with Iran as well.
Japan? It recently signed a $2 billion deal for oil exploration in
Iran. (Iran has the world’s third largest deposits of oil.)
And China’s insatiable energy appetite likely will prevent it from
supporting Security Council sanctions.
If the international community lets Iran go nuclear, the U.N.’s
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) would become a
laughingstock, and no longer serve as a deterrent to nuclear
proliferation. (Over the weekend, Tehran hinted, via a
regime-friendly newspaper, at withdrawing from the NPT.)
A nuclear Iran would undermine stability in region, threatening
the new Iraqi and Afghan governments and giving Syria and the
Saudis strong incentive to go nuclear, too.
And Iran has long-range missiles on the drawing table - so NATO,
Israel and the United States will become at risk.
It seems obvious: The Iranians aren’t interested in negotiations -
they’re interested in having the bomb.
We’ve tried to counter Iran’s nuclear intentions through
mommy-coddling diplomatic means for long enough: That approach has
failed miserably.
It’s time we all recognize this fact and agree to take the matter
to the Security Council for more drastic action.
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Peter Brookes writes a weekly column on
foreign policy and defense for the New York Post and is
penning a book on national security affairs for McGraw Hill due
out early next fall. He appears regularly on national TV and
radio.
Prior to joining the
Heritage Foundation,
Brookes served in the Bush administration as the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Asian and Pacific Affairs in the
Office of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, where he was
responsible for the development, planning, guidance and oversight
of U .S. security and defense policy for 38 countries and 5
bilateral defense alliances in the Asia-Pacific region.
Brookes has a distinguished military background, including active
duty in support of military operations in Iraq/Kuwait (Desert
Storm); Haiti (Restore Democracy); and Bosnia (Joint Endeavor). He
flew reconnaissance missions in East Asia and the Persian Gulf
while stationed in Japan covering military matters related to the
Soviet Union, North Korea, China, Vietnam, Iran and Iraq. His
personal awards and decorations include: the Joint Service
Commendation Medal; the Navy Commendation Medal (3 awards); the
Navy Achievement Medal; several naval and joint unit awards; the
Defense Language Institute’s Kellogg Award; the Joint Chiefs of
Staff service badge; and Naval Aviation Observer (NAO) wings.
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