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Uncovering The Truth About North Korea's Alleged Underground Nuclear Facility: The Kumchang-ri Controversy

"...there is strong information that makes us suspicious but we lack conclusive evidence that the intended purpose of the underground site is nuclear related."

--US Ambassador Charles Kartman, 21 November 1998 [1]

1. What is Kumchang-ri?

   Kumchang-ri is an underground site located northwest of Yongbyon, North Korea's frozen nuclear complex. It has been speculated that the site housed, or was intended to house a nuclear reactor or reprocessing facility.[2] Construction of Kumchang-ri is estimated to be complete within two to six years, depending on the amount of foreign assistance received.[3] North Korea continues to deny reports that the site is nuclear-related or intended to be, rather it says that Kumchang-ri is a civilian site.[4]

2. When did press reports about this facility first surface?

   There exist varying reports estimating when US intelligence sources first identified Kumchang-ri. Some of the earliest reports appeared in January 1998 following the release of a classified Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report discussing "an underground site" in North Korea.[5] However, it was not until mid-August 1998 that information, or rather speculation about the site began to be featured in the US media.

3. What did press releases allege about Kumchang-ri?

   The earliest press releases spoke about "thousands of North Korean workers tunneling in the side of a mountain."[6] It was alleged that the site housed, or was intended to house nuclear reactors or a nuclear reprocessing plant.[7] Then, in mid-November 1998 reports surfaced, which stated that samples of bark, leaves, soil, and waste water one centimeter deep had been collected from around the site. The samples tested positive for traces of radioactive plutonium, thereby leading to further speculation that the site contained or produced plutonium.[8]

4. What issues did Kumchang-ri raise?

1. Is North Korea undermining the 1994 US-North Korean Agreed Framework?

   Critics of the 1994 US-North Korean Agreed Framework in the US Congress, Pentagon, and the intelligence community argued that North Korea must submit Kumchang-ri to inspections; that if it did not, it would be in direct violation of the Agreed Framework. In short, they insisted that the agreement provided the United States with the right to inspect the facility.[9] However, according to Kenneth Quinnones, former director of North Korean affairs at the US Department of State, it is false to assume that the Agreed Framework gives the United States the right to inspect any facilities at Kumchang-ri or elsewhere. Rather, he said that when US Ambassador Robert Gallucci negotiated the Agreed Framework, he established a two-stage inspection process (found in the "confidential minute" to the agreement).

   First-stage inspections are to be conducted ONLY at specified facilities at the Yongbyon nuclear complex. Since the agreement was negotiated, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and US inspectors have had free access to these facilities and have been able to verify North Korea's compliance. Second-stage inspections will verify North Korea's compliance with its pledge not to build any other nuclear-related facilities. They will also be used to establish and verify how much spent nuclear fuel North Korea possesses. However, second-stage inspections will become mandatory for North Korea once the bulk of the construction work on the light-water reactor project is complete and before key nuclear components for the light-water reactor are delivered. Thus, according to the Agreed Framework, the only inspections North Korea must adhere to are IAEA inspections at specified facilities at the Yongbyon nuclear complex. Thus, North Korea is not obligated to permit inspections of Kumchang-ri and is not in violation of the agreement.[10] Furthermore, the United States cannot charge North Korea with undermining the Agreed Framework unless it is found to be constructing nuclear reactors or related equipment, or restarts its frozen nuclear program.

2. Is US policy towards North Korea effective?

   The discovery of Kumchang-ri and the 31 August 1998 Taep'o-dong-1 missile launch caused many US officials to question the viability of the Agreed Framework. With regard to opposition to the Agreed Framework, this was not a new phenomenon, nor a perspective that arose with the discovery of Kumchang-ri. Rather, US officials in Congress, the Pentagon, and the intelligence community have been opposed to the agreement since it was signed in 1994. The discovery of Kumchang-ri provided them with further evidence suggesting that North Korea was violating the agreement, and that it could not be verified. In turn, the discovery led both houses of Congress to adopt restrictions on further US funding to implement the Agreed Framework.[11]

   Critics of the Agreed Framework urged the Clinton administration to adopt a tougher line towards North Korea. In order to resolve the issue, US President Bill Clinton appointed former defense secretary William Perry as US Policy Coordinator for North Korea. Perry was tasked to evaluate current US policy towards North Korea and make recommendations on future policy. His report will be released in the latter-part of 1999, following his analysis of the Kumchang-ri inspection and North Korea's official response to US proposals for the normalization of political and economic relations. Despite Perry's undertaking, some US officials continue to advocate a stricter policy towards North Korea. One example is US Congressman Benjamin Gilman's (R-NY) recommendation on 19 May 1999 to implement the "North Korea Threat Reduction Act of 1999" (HR 1835).[12]

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Last Updated: Friday, April 25, 2008