Low-Yield Earth-Penetrating Nuclear
Weapons
By Robert W. Nelson
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of American Scientists Home - a very extensive resource
FAS Public Interest
Report
The Journal of the Federation of American Scientists |
January/February
2001
Volume 54, Number 1
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| Fig. 1
Diagrams like this one give the false
impression that a low-yield earth penetrating nuclear weapon
would "limit collateral damage" and therefore be relatively
safe to use. In fact, because of the large amount of
radioactive dirt thrown out in the explosion, the hypothetical
5-kiloton weapon discussed in the accompanying article would
produce a large area of lethal fallout. (Philadelphia
Inquirer/ Cynthia Greer, 16 October 2000.) |
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See a Video
Despite the global
sense of relief and hope that the nuclear arms race ended with the
Cold War, an increasingly vocal group of politicians, military
officials and leaders of America's nuclear weapon laboratories are
urging the US to develop a new generation of precision low-yield
nuclear weapons. Rather than deterring warfare with another nuclear
power, however, they suggest these weapons could be used in
conventional conflicts with third-world nations.
Critics argue that adding low-yield warheads to the
world's nuclear inventory simply makes their eventual use more likely.
In fact, a 1994 law currently prohibits the nuclear laboratories from
undertaking research and development that could lead to a precision
nuclear weapon of less than 5 kilotons (KT), because "low-yield
nuclear weapons blur the distinction between nuclear and conventional
war."
Last year, Senate Republicans John Warner (R-VA) and
Wayne Allard (R-CO) buried a small provision in the 2001 Defense
Authorization Bill that would have overturned these earlier
restrictions. Although the language in the final Act was watered down,
the Energy and Defense Departments are still required to undertake a
study of low-yield nuclear weapons that could penetrate deep into the
earth before detonating so as to "threaten hard and deeply buried
targets." Legislation for long-term research and actual development of
low-yield nuclear weapons will almost certainly be proposed again in
the current session of Congress.
Senators Warner and Allard imagine these nuclear
weapons could be used in small-scale conventional conflicts against
rogue dictators, while leaving most of the civilian population
untouched. As one anonymous former Pentagon official put it to the
Washington Post last spring,
"What's needed now is something that can threaten a
bunker tunneled under 300 meters of granite without killing the
surrounding civilian population."
Statements like these promote the illusion that
nuclear weapons could be used in ways which minimize their "collateral
damage," making them acceptable tools to be used like conventional
weapons.
As described in detail below, however, the use of
any nuclear weapon capable of destroying a buried target that is
otherwise immune to conventional attack will necessarily produce
enormous numbers of civilian casualties. No earth-burrowing missile
can penetrate deep enough into the earth to contain an explosion with
a nuclear yield even as small as 1 percent of the 15 kiloton Hiroshima
weapon. The explosion simply blows out a massive crater of radioactive
dirt, which rains down on the local region with an especially intense
and deadly fallout.
Moreover, as Congress understood in 1994, by seeking
to produce usable low-yield nuclear weapons, we risk blurring the now
sharp line separating nuclear and conventional warfare, and provide
legitimacy for other nations to similarly consider using nuclear
weapons in regional wars.
Conventional Earth-Penetrating Weapons
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| Fig. 2 The
Pentagon has a growing collection of high precision
conventional weapons capable of defeating hardened targets. In
this sled-driven test, the GBU-28 laser guided bomb with its
improved BLU-113 warhead penetrates several meters of
reinforced concrete. |
Fig. 3 A B2
bomber releases an unarmed B61-11 earth-penetrating bomb
during tests in Alaska. Despite falling from an altitude of
40,000 feet, this bomb burrowed only approximately 20 feet
into the soil. Any nuclear blast at this shallow depth would
not be contained, and would produce intense local fallout.
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Video clips from
CNN (2.2MB) and
Lockheed Martin (2.8MB)
The Pentagon already has a number of conventional
weapons capable of destroying hardened targets buried within
approximately 50 feet of the surface. The most well-known of these is
the GBU-28 developed and deployed in the final weeks of the air
campaign in the Gulf War. The Air Force was initially unable to
destroy a well-protected bunker north of Baghdad after repeated direct
hits. The 4000 lb GBU-28 was created from a very heavy surplus Army
eight-inch gun tube filled with conventional explosive and a modified
laser guidance kit. It destroyed the bunker, which was protected by
more than 30 feet of earth, concrete and hardened steel.
The precision, penetrating capability, and explosive
power of these conventional weapons has improved dramatically over the
last decade, and these trends will certainly continue. Indeed, the
GBU-37 guided bomb, a successor to the GBU-28, is already thought to
be capable of disabling a silo based ICBM a target formerly thought
vulnerable only to nuclear attack. In the near future, the United
States will deploy new classes of hard target penetrators which can
land within one to two meters of their targets.
The B61-11 Nuclear Bomb
However, mini-nuke advocates mostly coming from
the nuclear weapons labs argue that low-yield nuclear weapons should
be designed to destroy even deeper targets.
The US introduced an earth-penetrating nuclear
weapon in 1997, the B61-11, by putting the nuclear explosive from an
earlier bomb design into a hardened steel casing with a new nose cone
to provide ground penetration capability. The deployment was
controversial because of official US policy not to develop new nuclear
weapons. The DOE and the weapons labs have consistently argued,
however, that the B61-11 is merely a "modification" of an older
delivery system, because it used an existing "physics package."
The earth-penetrating capability of the B61-11 is
fairly limited, however. Tests show it penetrates only 20 feet or so
into dry earth when dropped from an altitude of 40,000 feet. Even so,
by burying itself into the ground before detonation, a much higher
proportion of the explosion energy is transferred to ground shock
compared to a surface bursts. Any attempt to use it in an urban
environment, however, would result in massive civilian casualties.
Even at the low end of its 0.3-300 kiloton yield range, the nuclear
blast will simply blow out a huge crater of radioactive material,
creating a lethal gamma-radiation field over a large area.
Containment
Just how deep must an underground nuclear explosion
be buried in order for the blast and fallout to be contained?
The US conducted a series of underground nuclear
explosions in the 1960s the Plowshare tests to investigate the
possible use of nuclear explosives for excavation purposes. Those
performed prior to the 1963 Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty, such as the
Sedan test shown in Figure 4, were buried at relatively shallow depths
to maximize the size of the crater produced.
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| Fig. 4 The
100 KT Sedan nuclear explosion, one of the Plowshares
excavation tests, was buried at a depth of 635 feet. The main
cloud and base surge are typical of shallow-buried nuclear
explosions. The cloud is highly contaminated with radioactive
dust particles and produces an intense local fallout.
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In addition to the immediate effects of blast, air
shock, and thermal radiation, shallow nuclear explosions produce
especially intense local radioactive fallout. The fireball breaks
through the surface of the earth, carrying into the air large amounts
of dirt and debris. This material has been exposed to the intense
neutron flux from the nuclear detonation, which adds to the
radioactivity from the fission products. The cloud typically consists
of a narrow column and a broad base surge of air filled with
radioactive dust which expands to a radius of over a mile for a 5
kiloton explosion.1 In the Plowshare
tests, roughly 50 percent of the total radioactivity produced in the
explosion was distributed as local fallout the other half being
confined to the highly-radioactive crater.
In order to be fully contained, nuclear explosions
at the Nevada Test Site must be buried at a depth of 650 feet for a 5
kiloton explosive 1300 feet for a 100-kiloton explosive.2
Even then, there are many documented cases where carefully sealed
shafts ruptured and released radioactivity to the local environment.
Therefore, even if an earth penetrating missile were
somehow able to drill hundreds of feet into the ground and then
detonate, the explosion would likely shower the surrounding region
with highly radioactive dust and gas.
Long-Rod Penetration
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| Fig. 5
Underground nuclear tests must be buried at large depths and
carefully sealed in order to fully contain the explosion.
Shallower bursts produce large craters and intense local
fallout. The situation shown here is for an explosion with a 1
KT yield and the depths shown are in feet. Even a 0.1 KT burst
must be buried at a depth of approximately 230 feet to be
fully contained. (Adapted from Terry Wallace, with
permission.) |
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It is straightforward to show, however, that the
maximum penetration depth is severely limited if the missile casing is
to remain intact. One can make reasonably accurate estimates of the
penetration depth based on the well-developed theory of "long-rod
penetration." The fundamental parameter R is the ratio of the
projectile ram pressure to the yield strength of the material.3
The target material yields, and penetration occurs, when R is
greater than one. For a steel rod to penetrate concrete, the minimum
velocities for penetration is about one half a kilometer per second
(1100 miles per hour). For ductile materials, the kinetic energy lost
from the penetrator can deform the target and dig out a penetration
crater.
Fundamentally, however, the depth of penetration is
limited by the yield strength of the penetrator in this case, the
missile casing. Even for the strongest materials, impact velocities
greater than a few kilometers per second will substantially deform and
even melt the impactor.
An earth-penetrating nuclear weapon must protect the
warhead and its associated electronics while it burrows into the
ground. This severely limits the missile to impact velocities of less
than about three kilometers per second for missile cases made from the
very hardest steels. From the theory of "long-rod penetration," in
this limit the maximum possible depth D of penetration is
proportional to the length and density of the penetrator and inversely
proportional to the density of the target. The maximum depth of
penetration depends only weakly on the yield strength of the
penetrator.4 For typical values for
steel and concrete, we expect an upper bound to the penetration depth
to be roughly 10 times the missile length, or about 100 feet for a 10
foot missile. In actual practice the impact velocity and penetration
depth must be well below this to ensure the missile and its contents
are not severely damaged.
Given these constraints, it is simply not possible
for a kinetic energy weapon to penetrate deeply enough into the earth
to contain a nuclear explosion.
The Weapons Labs and the CTBT
The most vocal proponents of new small-yield weapons
come from the nation's nuclear weapons laboratories, at Los Alamos and
Livermore.
In a 1991 Strategic Affairs article entitled
"Countering the Threat of the Well-armed Tyrant," Los Alamos weapons
analysts Thomas Dowler and Joseph Howard II, argued that the US has no
proportionate response to a rogue dictator who uses chemical or
biological weapons against US troops. Our smallest nuclear weapons
those with Hiroshima-size yieldswould be so devastating that no US
president could use them. We would be "self-deterred." To counter this
dilemma, they argued the US should develop "mininukes," with yields
equivalent to 0.01-1 KT: "... nuclear weapons with very low yields
could provide an effective response for countering the enemy in such a
crisis, while not violating the principle of proportionality."
More recently, in a speech to the Nuclear Security
Decisionmakers Forum, Sandia Laboratory Director Paul Robinson stated
"The US will undoubtedly require a new nuclear
weapon ... because it is realized that the yields of the weapons left
over from the Cold War are too high for addressing the deterrence
requirements of a multi polar, widely proliferated world. Without
rectifying that situation, we would end up being self-deterred."
A more cynical interpretation of these statements is
that the laboratory staff and leadership simply feel threatened by the
current restrictions on their activities, and want to generate a new
mission (and the associated funding) to keep them in operation
indefinitely. Indeed, beginning in 1990 with the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, there was serious discussion
of closing one of the bomb labs.
Moreover, President Clinton ended US nuclear testing
in 1993, and signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) a
permanent worldwide ban on nuclear testing in 1996. Despite the
Senate's failure to ratify the CTBT in 1999, its proponents believe
the treaty will eventually come into force. The major nuclear powers
continue to abide by the world moratorium on nuclear testing, and even
India and Pakistan appear to have joined the moratorium after their
May 1998 nuclear tests.
The nuclear weapons labs are particularly threatened
by the CTBT, since it will probably limit them to maintaining the
stockpile of weapons already in our arsenal. Keeping young scientists
interested in the weapons program is especially difficult when their
main job is the relatively mundane task of assuring reliability. The
labs desire the challenge of designing new nuclear weapons, simply for
the scientific and technical training experience the effort would
bring. Hence, there is tremendous pressure to create a new mission
that justifies a new development program.
But could the US deploy a new low-yield nuclear
earth-penetrating weapon without testing it? Under continued political
pressure to support the Test Ban and its related Stockpile Stewardship
Program, Los Alamos Associate Director Steve Younger has stated, "one
could design and deploy a new set of nuclear weapons that do not
require nuclear testing to be certified. However, ... such simple
devices would be based on a very limited nuclear test database."
On the other hand, it seems unlikely that a warhead
capable of performing such an extraordinary mission as destroying a
deeply buried and hardened bunker could be deployed without full-scale
testing. First, even if the missile casing were able to withstand the
high-velocity ground impact, the warhead "physics package" and
accompanying electronics must function under extreme conditions. The
primary device must detonate and produce a reliable yield shortly
after suffering an intense shock deceleration. Second, there must be
great confidence that the actual nuclear yield is not greater than
expected. Since the natural energy scale for a fission nuclear weapon
is of order 10 KT, much lower yield weapons must be sensitive to
exacting design tolerances; the final yield is determined by an
exponentially growing number of fission-produced neutrons, so the
total number of neutron generations must be finely-tuned. Given that
these weapons may be used near population centers, it thus seems
highly unlikely that designers could certify a low-yield warhead
without actually testing it.
What would be the consequence if the US decides to
go ahead and test a new generation of nuclear weapons? As House
Democrats expressed in a letter to Rep. Ike Skelton of Missouri, the
ranking Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee,
"The resumption of nuclear test explosions that will
result from such a program involving nuclear weapons would decrease
rather than increase our national security and undermine US and
international non-proliferation efforts."
If the US abandons the moratorium, Russia and China
will almost certainly respond in kind destroying prospects for
eventual passage of the CTBT.
Conclusion
Proponents of building a new generation of small
nuclear weapons have seldom been specific about situations where
nuclear devices would be able to perform a unique mission. The one
clear scenario is using these warheads as a substitute for
conventional weapons to attack deeply buried facilities. Based on the
analysis here, however, this mission does not appear possible without
causing massive radioactive contamination. No American president would
elect to use nuclear weapons in this situation unless another
country had already used nuclear weapons against us.
The end of the Cold War should allow us to place
further limits on the development and use of nuclear weapons. The
danger of moving from a conventional to a nuclear war is so enormous,
that the US refrained from using nuclear weapons in Korea even when US
troops were in danger of being overwhelmed. Attempts to develop a new
generation of low-yield nuclear weapons would only make nuclear war
more likely, and they seem cynically designed to provide legitimacy to
nuclear testing - steps that would return us to the dangers of Cold
War nuclear competition, but with a larger number of nations
participating.
Robert W. Nelson, a theoretical physicist who
works on technical arms control issues, is on the research staff of
Princeton University and a consultant to FAS.
Notes:
1The base surge
radius scales roughly as 4000 W1/3kt
feet, where Wkt is the yield in kilotons.
2In general, NTS
tests are buried at depths of D
450 Wkt1/3.4
feet to be fully contained.
3R =
v2 /
2Y = (v/vc) 2 where
is the
projectile density, v is its velocity, Y is the yield strength
of the material, and the critical velocity vc = (2Y
/ )1/2
4For a penetrator
which is much stronger than the target, D/L
( p
/ t)
ln(Yp / Yt), where L is the length
of the penetrator,
is the
material density, and Y is the material strength to plastic
yielding; the subscripts p and t stand for the
penetrator and target. |