Chinese produce new
type of sub
By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
China's naval buildup
has produced a new type of attack submarine that U.S. intelligence did not
know was under construction, according to U.S. defense and intelligence
officials.
The submarine was spotted several weeks
ago for the first time and has been designated by the Pentagon as the
first Yuan-class of submarine.
A photograph of the completed submarine in the water at China's Wuhan
shipyard was posted on a Chinese Internet site this week and confirmed by
a defense official as the new submarine. Wuhan is located inland, some 420
miles west of Shanghai.
One official said the new submarine was
a "technical surprise" to U.S. intelligence, which was unaware that
Beijing was building a new non-nuclear powered attack submarine. U.S.
intelligence agencies have few details about the new submarine but believe
it is diesel-powered rather than nuclear-powered, said officials who spoke
on the condition of anonymity.
The new boat, which appears to be a
combination of indigenous Chinese hardware and Russian weapons, suggests
that China is building up its submarine forces in preparation for a
conflict over Taiwan, defense analysts say.
"China has decided submarines are its
first-line warships now, their best shot at beating carriers," said Sid
Trevethan, an Alaska-based specialist on the Chinese military. "And China
is right."
"One has to marvel at the enormity of
the investment by the People's Liberation Army in submarines," said
Richard Fisher, a specialist on the Chinese military.
China also is building two
nuclear-powered submarines — one Type 093, believed to be based on the
Russian Victor-III class and armed with intercontinental ballistic
missiles, and a Type 094 attack submarine, which the Pentagon believes has
a finished hull and will be ready for deployment next year.
According to Mr. Trevethan, China
currently has a force of 57 deployed submarines, including one Xia-class
nuclear ballistic missile submarine, five Han submarines, four Kilos,
seven Songs, 18 Mings and 22 Soviet-designed Romeos. Beijing also has
eight more Kilos on order with Russia.
Disclosure of the new submarine comes
as the United States is trying to sell eight diesel submarines to Taiwan,
which Beijing views as a breakaway province. Taiwan currently has just two
World War II-era Guppy-class submarines and two 1980s Dutch submarines.
Mr. Fisher, an analyst with the
International Assessment and Strategy Center, said that despite the
imbalance of power on the Taiwan Strait in favor of Beijing, the Bush
administration has been slow to sell the submarines it offered Taiwan in
April 2001.
"It is simply appalling that the United
States cannot get its act together to organize the production of eight new
submarines for Taiwan," Mr. Fisher said.
U.S. defense officials have said delays
with the Taiwan submarine deal are the result of the Taipei government's
budget problems.
Chinese leaders told National Security
Adviser Condoleezza Rice last week that China would "not sit idly by" as
Taiwan moved toward formal independence, and President Hu Jintao denounced
U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan.
But Miss Rice said the United States
will go ahead with its Taiwan arms sales plan because of China's missile
buildup opposite the island.
A Pentagon report made public in May
stated that China is changing its warship forces from a coastal defense
force to one employing "active offshore defense."
"This change in operations requires
newer, more modern warships and submarines capable of operating at greater
distances from China's coast for longer periods," the report said, noting
that submarine construction is a top priority.
Mr. Fisher said the Chinese submarine
buildup should prompt the Pentagon to step up U.S. anti-submarine warfare
capabilities, which he said are "at an historic low" because of cutbacks
in specialized ships and aircraft.
The Navy should consider building its
own diesel attack submarine to be able to "effectively duke it out with
the new tidal wave of Chinese subs, that if left unchecked, may soon
dominate the Asian littoral regions," Mr. Fisher said.
The Pentagon is also building up U.S.
naval forces in the Pacific, with the addition of up to six attack
submarines in Guam and the possible deployment of an aircraft carrier
battle group to Hawaii in the coming months.
China's Subs Lead
the Way
Proceedings, March
2003
By Dr. Lyle Goldstein and Lieutenant Commander Bill Murray, U.S. Navy
China's maritime strategy relies heavily on submarines to patrol the
littorals, blockade the Taiwan Strait, and stalk aircraft carriers. The
U.S. Navy should not underestimate China's ability to build a capable
submarine force to challenge a superior maritime foe.
While the U.S. military remains focused on the Middle East and Central
Asia, China continues its rapid military modernization. Perhaps the most
significant development for the U.S. Navy is China's extensive efforts to
upgrade its submarine force. In addition to signing a contract with Russia
for eight new Kilo-class diesel submarines last May, China continues to
field its new indigenous Song class. The appearance of its new nuclear
attack submarine (SSN) is imminent. Finally, Beijing is upgrading the
submarine force's weaponry, recruitment, training, and doctrine-all of
which suggest that submarines will form the backbone of China's gradual
strategic reorientation toward maritime priorities. As one Chinese
strategist recently wrote: "Submarines are the maritime weapons posing the
greatest threat to an aircraft carrier formation. Submarines are also our
Navy's core force."1
Retired Navy Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, a close observer of the
Chinese Navy, similarly contends that submarines "are an essential
ingredient in the ... maritime strategy of China," and calls for focused
research on China's submarine force.2
Diesels for the Littoral
The scale of China's $1.6-billion Kilo purchase suggests that People's
Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) strategists view diesel submarines as a vital
asset. The eight new Project 636 Kilos, which are Russia's "best," will
augment two older 636s and two somewhat more limited Project 877s that
China already owns. Combined, these 12 imported submarines will help make
China's 30 aging Romeos and its 20-odd Mings (an indigenously modified
Romeo) and newer Song-class submarines a formidable prospective undersea
opponent in the East Asian littoral.
Even today, the Kilo probably is the most potent of China's submarines.
Quiet and well armed, they deserve a measure of respect. The new set of
Kilos, which China expects to receive within three to five years, will
incorporate a number of significant upgrades, including superior
batteries, an enhanced digital sonar system, slower turning screws, and
quieter main engines.3
The weaponry of these new ships also will be more sophisticated. In
addition to the heavyweight wire-guided Test-71ME and the 53-65KE
wake-homing torpedoes of their predecessors, they will carry the versatile
and potent Klub weapon system, giving them the capability to fire
land-attack cruise missiles, antiship cruise missiles with supersonic
terminal homing, and rocket thrown antisurface and antisubmarine
torpedoes. The new Kilos also likely will deploy Russia's supercavitating
Skval torpedo, which, according to a Chinese report, travels in excess of
200 knots. Disturbingly, this article hints that the Skval system may
already be operational within the PLAN submarine force.4
Air independent propulsion (AIP) might enhance the PLAN's next generation
of diesel submarines. Although AIP-equipped diesel submarines cannot match
the endurance or speed of nuclear submarines, AIP does permit diesel
submarines to remain submerged for weeks at a time without snorkeling.
European submarine manufacturers offer it as an option on their newest
export classes. Pakistan, China's longtime ally, is getting AIP, and there
is little reason to believe Beijing will settle for less. In addition,
Chinese naval periodicals indicate a significant interest in AIP.5
The Russian submarine builder Rubin offers a liquid oxygen and hydrogen
fuel cell AIP system as an option on the latest Kilo models. Even
Chinese-built diesel submarines may soon have AIP. Analysts noted last
year that China's 20th Ming-class submarine was two meters longer than its
predecessor, fueling speculation that it might be a test bed for an AIP
system.6
A recent Pentagon report to Congress on Chinese military modernization
concludes, "A new advanced version of the Song-class conventional
submarine is expected to incorporate advanced AIP." This report details
other Song innovations: a skewed seven-blade propeller, submerged antiship
cruise missile launch capability, flank array sonars of French design, and
German diesel engines.7
The PLAN intends the Song to be a modern, capable peer to its imported
Kilos. Alternatively, some have interpreted the May 2002 Kilo sale as the
death knell of the Song program. Indeed, the half-decade between launches
of the first two Songs and the dramatic changes in the second Song's sail
suggest possible performance and design troubles. Close analysis, however,
of the sail's restructuring suggests that these design flaws were related
to acoustic signature rather than underwater stability, as had been
speculated in the open press. The recent completion of a third Song, and
the apparent continued work on hulls four and five, suggest that the
program is going forward.8
If China does continue to build Songs, the PLAN submarine force is
undeniably in the midst of a major near-term buildup.
Blue-Water Ambitions
The PLAN will soon deploy the first successor to its noisy and unreliable
first-generation nuclear submarines. The new Type 93 SSN will augment the
obsolete Han class, the last of which was commissioned in 1990. Though
Chinese nuclear submarines are widely dismissed as obsolete, the Chinese
press continues to extol sorties by these SSNs, even claiming that they
played a role in the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis.9
Open sources state that the Type 93 will have an indigenously manufactured
nuclear reactor and be technologically similar to the
Russian Victor III,
possessing enhanced sonar capabilities and advanced quieting.10
The first prototype is nearly finished and a bow-on photograph of the
vessel in drydock suggests that the ship has both upper and lower bow
sonar assemblies, as well as flank arrays. A recent Chinese source,
however, claims that the Type 93 will have 65-cm tubes, which suggests it
will be able to carry Russia's largest wake-homing torpedo designed
specifically to destroy aircraft carriers.11
China's second-generation ballistic-missile nuclear submarine (SSBN) lags
behind the SSN program. Known as the Type 94, it eventually will replace
the 20-year-old, problem-plagued prototype of the Xia class, which itself
recently emerged from a major overhaul. Chinese sources assess that the
Type 94 aims to have a quieter acoustic signature than the Russian
Typhoon, and will deploy with 16 8,000-km-range submarine-launched
ballistic missiles, each equipped with three to six warheads.12
It is likely that the first of the Type 94 SSBNs will not be launched for
at least five years, perhaps longer. Despite this delay, the amount of
space dedicated to SSBNs in China's journal of naval warfare, Jianchuan
Zhishi, implies that the PLAN's determination to develop a functional SSBN
force remains strong. Taken as a whole, Chinese efforts in nuclear
submarines suggest a measured commitment to the development of a
blue-water capability over the longer term.
Personnel, Training, and R&D
Despite an overall reduction in personnel, the PLAN is building
communities of intellectual excellence, including the submarine force.
China recognizes that pay incentives help attract qualified specialists in
a competitive labor market, and in recent years have initiated generous
pay increases. Some ranks saw a salary increase of 100% in 1999-2000. Like
their U.S. counterparts, the PLAN reportedly gives priority to
"outstanding student cadres whom are willing to volunteer for submarine
service."13
Chinese military leaders have identified a severe deficiency in developing
competent noncommissioned officers. Apparently, a policy to redress this
problem is producing a new cadre of specialists for undersea warfare.14
Capping this off, the PLA is putting the finishing touches on a rigorous
system of professional military education, including an initiative that
replicates the U.S. Reserve Officer Training Corps program. The new system
is so similar to the United States that a recent profile of one Chinese
submarine force admiral's resume reads similarly to a U.S. counterpart's:
Admiral Zhang Xizhao completed two tours at the Qingdao Submarine Academy,
and one each at the Nanjing Naval Command and Staff College and at the
PLA's National Defense University in Beijing.15
Even more significant, the PLAN appears to be implementing a training
revolution. As good students of U.S. military operations, Chinese
commanders have become increasingly conscious of the imperative for joint
planning and operations.16
For example, the PLAN recently implemented an innovative program of "cross
training" surface and submarine commanders.17
Another striking facet of their effort to upgrade training is a shift from
rote, repetitive drills to "confrontational" training, which allows for
greater exercise free play. As with joint operations, this notion appears
to be an effort to imitate successful U.S. practices. Competitive,
realistic war games also are becoming standard in the fleet and within the
submarine force.18
Analysts generally agree that after the Taiwan Strait crisis the PLA
focused on the United States as its most likely future adversary. Training
with U.S. capabilities in mind has enabled its submarine force to
incorporate substantial innovations into its exercises. Working under the
assumption that its bases would be damaged early in a conflict, for
example, the PLAN recently conducted a drill in which torpedoes were
loaded onto a submarine at a small civilian port employing mobile cranes
and other special equipment.19
Another drill focused on clearing disabled ships from a vital navigation
channel,20
and a logistics exercise featured practice in disguising important targets
and conducting rush repairs.21
In addition, "seaborne supply" operations have been conducted with the
newest submarines.22
Beijing's commitment to undersea warfare over the long term depends on
developing an outstanding science and technology research system that will
sustain the fleet's development. The outlines of such a system are
beginning to appear. The PLAN leadership has selected Wuhan and Harbin
Universities as sites of maritime engineering excellence. The former,
which opened officially in 1999, combines the Navy Engineering and Navy
Electronics Academies. The curriculum is focused on "tackling the key
problem of fusing and joining electronic information to weapons systems."23
The latter has colleges of nuclear propulsion and underwater engineering.
Recent research achievements of Harbin University for the PLAN include
technology for ocean-bottom topographic mapping and a dual-use submersible
for mine detection and deep-ocean salvage.24
Chinese researchers also are working on lasers for submarine detection,
and remote seabed hydrophone systems. These efforts are complemented by
espionage. The director of the acoustic noise laboratory at Russia's
Pacific Oceanography Institute is now on trial in Vladivostok for
allegedly trying to smuggle secrets to the Chinese.
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to assume that China's future undersea
warfare technology prospects are dependent on Russian expertise. Many U.S.
analysts fall into the trap of extrapolating from the PLAN's historical
evolution, underestimating the impact of "systemic shocks" such as the
Korean War or the Cultural Revolution to that development. It is a serious
error, therefore, to predict future developments within the Chinese
submarine force based on historical development examples such as that of
the Han SSN, which underwent sea trials 16 years after its approval by
Chinese leadership.25
Taiwan and the Blockade Scenario
Analysts generally agree that an invasion of Taiwan will remain beyond the
reach of the PLA for at least the next decade. Notwithstanding the steady
upgrading of the PLA Air Force, the revamping of Chinese special forces,
and the fielding of a vast array of short-range missiles, a critical
shortage of modern amphibious landing craft makes a full-scale invasion
unlikely. The PLAN's near-term focus on diesel submarines, however, is one
of several indicators suggesting that Beijing's preferred coercive tool
against Taiwan would be a naval blockade.
As an island with few resources, Taiwan may be vulnerable to this form of
coercion. The volatility of Taipei's stock market during previous
cross-strait crises suggests that Taiwan's economy could face a meltdown
if confronted with determined efforts to subvert it. Compounding this
problem, it is likely that the mainland could exploit Taiwan's internal
political fissures during a crisis. In other words, speedy capitulation is
conceivable if Beijing confronts Taipei with a sophisticated strategy of
sticks and carrots.
Chinese diesel submarines would be the decisive force in this troubling
scenario. With its older submarines employed as minelayers and decoys, the
more modern submarines could patrol north, south, and east of the island.
Even a very few ship sinkings would prompt insurance brokers to revoke
their coverage of merchant shipping, and commerce at Taiwan's two biggest
ports, Taipei and Kaoshiung, would grind to a halt. Taiwan might try to
break the blockade on its own, but its chance of success would be low. Its
otherwise formidable air force might fall victim to missile strikes, but
even without such strikes, Taiwan's aircraft are not well suited for
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations. Reportedly, only 6 of their 26
S-2T Tracker ASW aircraft, which have been flying since the late 1950s,
are operational.26
Taiwan's current budget crunch casts doubt on the hoped-for purchase of 12
P-3C Orions from the United States, potentially forcing continued
dependence on the unreliable S-2Ts through 2008. The imminent delivery of
four Kidd (DD-661)-class destroyers will not help either, because the root
of Taiwan's ASW woes is an inadequate number of overall platforms for the
mission.
There has been much talk of expanding Taiwan's fleet of four diesel
submarines, two of which date from World War II. But Taiwan's prospective
purchase of eight diesel submarines from the United States is plagued by
obstacles. First, it is far from clear that diesel submarines are optimal
for the ASW mission. Second, the United States no longer builds diesel
submarines, and those U.S. allies that do, such as Germany, are hesitant
to jeopardize their relations with Beijing. Third, the PLAN expects to
take delivery of eight more Kilos between 2005 and 2007 and might have a
system for accelerated crew training given its large force of submarines.
By contrast, the earliest Taiwan could receive eight new submarines would
be 2010. Moreover, crew training is expected to be a major bottleneck,
suggesting some additional years before the vessels are truly operational.
This time lag, even under assumptions that favor Taiwan, will bring an
even more substantial capability gap later in this decade. Finally, with
the Taiwan defense budget at an eight-year low, the possibility of Taiwan
making a $4-5 billion commitment for submarines seems remote.27
Thus, it is unlikely that Taiwan will be able to cope with a blockade
imposed by the PLAN in the foreseeable future.
The United States could break the blockade, but the growing capability of
the PLAN submarine force will increase the risk to U.S. maritime forces,
especially as U.S. antisubmarine warfare capabilities have withered since
the end of the Cold War. Alternatively, U.S. SSNs could conduct a campaign
against Chinese submarines, especially in the deep waters to the east of
the island where the bigger, more sophisticated U.S. submarines could make
full use of their superior technology. Even the U.S. submarine force must
expect losses, however, given improvements in Chinese submarine platforms,
training, weaponry, and the sheer weight of numbers.
Evolving Submarine Doctrine
Previously, PLAN doctrine did not task China's submarines with an ASW
role. This is changing, and the development of submarine ASW tactics
appears to be a priority.28
PLAN submarine captains recognize that active pinging is tantamount to
suicide and are shifting their focus to improving the performance of
passive sonars, including towed arrays.29
Chinese submarines increasingly are equipped with digital sonar systems
that make extensive use of commercial off-the-shelf computer processing
technology.30
Multiple references in Chinese technical journals demonstrate a keen
interest in sound surveillance system technology,31
and China's military analysts also are studying sonar countermeasures.32
In addition, Chinese sources openly describe using certain submarines as
"bait."33
Relying on this tactic, it is conceivable that U.S. submarines could
reveal their presence to lurking Kilos by executing attacks against
nuisance Ming-class vessels.
Despite increasing attention to antisubmarine warfare, PLAN writings leave
little doubt that destruction of U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups
remains the focal point of doctrinal development, and Chinese submarines
might be the greatest threat. Chinese planners estimate, "[T]here is no
way [for U.S. carriers] to evade . . . reconnaissance and tracking,"34
and in the Russian tradition believe that a carrier battle group can be
destroyed with multiwave and multivector saturation attacks with up to
"100 antiship cruise missiles from all launch platforms in a single
attack."35
The same analysis describes Russia's Cold War-era anticarrier forces in
great detail and concludes: "This is Russia's asymmetrical and economical
answer to the threat of U.S. aircraft carriers. In the Russian armed
forces, no other force could surely fight this threat except submarines."36
Chinese planners also have duly noted that during World War II, 17
aircraft carriers were sunk by submarines.37
Conclusion
China is not the first land power to challenge a maritime nation's sea
supremacy by investing disproportionately in submarines. Whether China
will succeed where Germany and the Soviet Union failed is one of the
greatest questions of maritime strategy for the 21st century.
Consequently, while the U.S. Navy must necessarily focus on projecting
power into the Persian Gulf and Central Asia, it should guard its core
competence of sea control. Conflict with China is not inevitable. Economic
interdependence mitigates trends toward geopolitical competition.
Moreover, close examination of the Taiwan issue discloses significant room
for compromise. But if war with China does occur, the U.S. sea service
will do the heavy lifting. This means that, for the foreseeable future,
the Navy must retain an ability to locate and destroy Chinese submarines.
The Authors:
Dr. Goldstein is associate professor of strategic studies at the U.S.
Naval War College. An expert on Chinese security policy, he has studied in
both China and Russia. Lieutenant Commander Murray is a military research
fellow at the U.S. Naval War College's Strategic Research Department. He
served tours on two fast-attack submarines and served as action officer in
the operations directorate at U.S. Strategic Command.
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